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Concept

Expressive power

What a language can and cannot distinguish, measured by the equivalence between structures it respects rather than by a list of what it can say. Naming that equivalence settles every question of the form *can this be expressed* at once.

Named by 10 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.

3 rounds on chains of 4 and 5. Two chains of dots with pebbles placed in turn, and the transcript of a play: Spoiler picks an element of one chain, Duplicator answers in the other, and the pebbles must keep the same order.

A game that decides what can be said

Two players take turns pointing at elements of two structures; if the second can survive k rounds, then no sentence with k quantifiers tells the structures apart — a statement about infinitely many formulas, settled by a finite search.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games Two models the modal language cannot separate, and two it can. Four Kripke models in two pairs: the upper pair joined by a bisimulation and agreeing on every formula, the lower pair separated by a formula found by search.

Two diagrams the language cannot tell apart

A modal formula sees a diagram of worlds and arrows through a very narrow window. Exactly how narrow is settled by a game: where one player can answer every move, no formula whatever separates the two starting worlds, however different the diagrams look.

logic · Modal logic Axioms, the conditions on the arrows they answer to, and the one that answers to none. A table of modal axioms with the property of the accessibility relation each corresponds to, every row decided by sweeping all relations on up to four worlds.

The axiom with no property of the arrows

Each axiom of modal logic can be matched by hand to a condition on the arrows between worlds. There is a recipe that does it for a whole class of axioms, and there is an axiom the recipe cannot reach — not because nobody has looked, but because no condition on the arrows defines it at all.

logic · Modal logic Three properties that leave the middle, and one that cannot. Four measured curves of the share of random graphs having a property, plotted against the number of points: three first-order properties running to zero or one, and the parity of the edge count sitting on a half throughout.

Nearly always, or nearly never

Toss a coin for every pair of points and ask whether the graph that results has some property. For a property a first-order sentence can state, the answer in the limit is never a genuine probability — it is zero or it is one, and the game is what proves it.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games What a sentence of depth 2 can reach. Two rings of points, of 14 and 19 points, each with a run of 9 consecutive points marked as the neighbourhood a sentence of depth 2 can inspect.

The distance a sentence can see

A first-order sentence with three quantifiers cannot notice anything about a graph beyond a fixed distance from the points it names. That single limitation is why it cannot say connected, and why the failure survives every attempt to add more quantifiers.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games Two graphs every count agrees on, and one question that does not. Two sixteen-point graphs drawn on a four-by-four grid, with one point marked and its six neighbours highlighted in each, the neighbours forming two triangles in one and a six-cycle in the other.

One gadget defeats every refinement

Colour refinement fails on two triangles against a hexagon; its two-dimensional version fixes that and fails on a pair of strongly regular graphs. For every k there are two graphs the k-dimensional version cannot separate, and they are built from one local piece whose only symmetry is a parity.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games Who survives with two pebbles and who with three, over 4 rounds. A table of three pairs of graphs with, for each, whether the duplicating player survives a two-pebble game and a three-pebble game played to a fixed depth.

The boundary at three variables

Restrict a sentence to two variable names and it can still be arbitrarily long, because the names are reused. What it cannot be is deep: every satisfiable two-variable sentence has a small model, so asking whether one is satisfiable is a bounded search. Allow a third name and the question becomes undecidable.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games The order type of a nonstandard model of arithmetic. The ordinary numbers as a run of dots, followed by 9 galaxies — copies of the integers — at the positions of c/2 up to 2c, ordered densely like the rationals, with c² beyond. Infinitely many more galaxies lie between those drawn.

A number larger than every number

Ask for a number bigger than 0, bigger than 1, bigger than 2, and so on for ever. Every finite piece of that request is granted by an ordinary number, so compactness grants all of it at once — in a structure that satisfies every sentence true of the whole numbers and still contains something beyond all of them. Nothing in first-order logic can say 'and nothing else'.

logic · Models Six formulas on the interval of truth values. Graphs on [0, 1] of six one-variable formulas of Łukasiewicz logic, each a zigzag of whole-number slopes with values 0 or 1 at the ends.

The zigzags a formula can draw

Let truth be any number from 0 to 1, and Łukasiewicz's connectives turn every formula in one variable into a graph. Every graph that appears is a zigzag of straight pieces with whole-number slopes, ending at 0 or 1 — and McNaughton proved in 1951 that every such zigzag appears. A logic of degrees of truth turns out to be a theory of piecewise-linear functions with integer coefficients.

logic · Non classical logic A subword can be checked with one quantifier block; a factor cannot. Subword aba: monoid 7, J-trivial, degree 3; factor aba: monoid 12, aperiodic, not J-trivial; witness abab / abba.

One block of quantifiers, read off an algebra

Which properties of words can be stated with existential quantifiers alone — 'there are positions, in this order, carrying these letters' — and Boolean combinations of such statements? Imre Simon answered in 1975: exactly those whose syntactic monoid is J-trivial. Of the 57,068 languages that automata of up to four states recognise, 848 pass the test, and every one of them is decided by which words of length three or less it contains as scattered subwords.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games

Named alongside it

The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.

Exhaustive searchQuantifierDecision procedureElementary equivalenceModelStrategyAccessibilityAxiomEhrenfeucht fraisse gameEquivalence relationKripke modelModal logic

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