Concept

Quantifier

A word settling how many things a statement is about — every one of them, or at least one. Which one is used, and in which order, is where most of the content of a mathematical statement lives.

Named by 6 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.

The 256 syllogistic forms, and the 24 that work. A grid with one cell per syllogistic form, marked according to whether it is valid and what it needs to be valid.

Twenty-four out of two hundred and fifty-six

Aristotle's syllogisms are four sentence forms in four arrangements, which makes 256 patterns of argument. Fifteen of them are valid. Nine more become valid if you assume the things being talked about exist, and the gap between those numbers is a two-thousand-year-old disagreement.

logic · Class diagrams
j is one more than i, counting round — as a grid, with both quantifier readings. A grid of marks for a relation, with the row and column facts the two quantifier orders ask about.

Every row, or one column

For every person there is someone who loves them, and there is someone who loves everyone, are the same six words in a different order. Draw the relation as a grid and they become two obviously different questions — one about rows, one about columns.

logic · Quantifiers
3 rounds on chains of 4 and 5. Two chains of dots with pebbles placed in turn, and the transcript of a play: Spoiler picks an element of one chain, Duplicator answers in the other, and the pebbles must keep the same order.

A game that decides what can be said

Two players take turns pointing at elements of two structures; if the second can survive k rounds, then no sentence with k quantifiers tells the structures apart — a statement about infinitely many formulas, settled by a finite search.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games
Three properties that leave the middle, and one that cannot. Four measured curves of the share of random graphs having a property, plotted against the number of points: three first-order properties running to zero or one, and the parity of the edge count sitting on a half throughout.

Nearly always, or nearly never

Toss a coin for every pair of points and ask whether the graph that results has some property. For a property a first-order sentence can state, the answer in the limit is never a genuine probability — it is zero or it is one, and the game is what proves it.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games
What a sentence of depth 2 can reach. Two rings of points, of 14 and 19 points, each with a run of 9 consecutive points marked as the neighbourhood a sentence of depth 2 can inspect.

The distance a sentence can see

A first-order sentence with three quantifiers cannot notice anything about a graph beyond a fixed distance from the points it names. That single limitation is why it cannot say connected, and why the failure survives every attempt to add more quantifiers.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games
Closed after 3 uses of the universal. The Herbrand expansion of a first-order question at 5 stages, with the number of remaining models at each. It reaches nought after 3 instantiations.

The instance that has to be guessed

Every rule of a propositional tableau replaces a formula by shorter ones, which is why it stops. The rule for a universal claim does not replace it — it keeps it and adds an instance — and one word changing turns a decision procedure into a search that may run forever.

logic · Proof systems

Named alongside it

The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.

Decision procedureElementary equivalenceExhaustive searchExpressive powerStrategyCounterexampleQuantifier orderAsymptoticCategorical statementCompletenessConnectivityExistential import

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