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Concept

Model — where it appears

A structure giving each symbol of a formal language a meaning, so that every sentence of it becomes true or false. Exhibiting one is how a statement is shown unprovable from a set of axioms, since a derivation would have to hold in every model.

Named by 9 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.

A line, a point, and many parallels. A disc whose lines are arcs meeting the boundary at right angles, showing several lines through one point that never meet a given line.

Two worlds that both obey the rules

A statement is independent of a list of axioms when there is a structure satisfying the axioms where it holds and another where it fails. That is not a claim about what nobody has managed to prove — it is a proof that nobody can.

logic · Models 3 rounds on chains of 4 and 5. Two chains of dots with pebbles placed in turn, and the transcript of a play: Spoiler picks an element of one chain, Duplicator answers in the other, and the pebbles must keep the same order.

A game that decides what can be said

Two players take turns pointing at elements of two structures; if the second can survive k rounds, then no sentence with k quantifiers tells the structures apart — a statement about infinitely many formulas, settled by a finite search.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games The tower of sizes, and the gap in it. A tower of infinite sizes, each the number of sub-collections of the one below, with the space between the first two marked as the one no proof decides.

The size that cannot be pinned down

There is no largest infinity, because no collection has as many members as it has sub-collections. What is not settled is whether anything sits between the first two — and that is not an open problem but a proved absence of an answer.

logic · Cardinality A model whose worlds are sets of sentences. Worlds labelled by which of a fixed finite set of formulas they accept, with an arrow wherever every boxed formula accepted by one has its inside accepted by the other.

Worlds built out of sentences

A Kripke model needs worlds, and nothing so far has said where worlds come from. They can be made of the syntax: a world is a set of formulas it commits to, one world sees another when the boxed commitments line up, and in the model that results every formula is true exactly where it was assumed.

logic · Modal logic Who survives with two pebbles and who with three, over 4 rounds. A table of three pairs of graphs with, for each, whether the duplicating player survives a two-pebble game and a three-pebble game played to a fixed depth.

The boundary at three variables

Restrict a sentence to two variable names and it can still be arbitrarily long, because the names are reused. What it cannot be is deep: every satisfiable two-variable sentence has a small model, so asking whether one is satisfiable is a bounded search. Allow a third name and the question becomes undecidable.

logic · Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games The order type of a nonstandard model of arithmetic. The ordinary numbers as a run of dots, followed by 9 galaxies — copies of the integers — at the positions of c/2 up to 2c, ordered densely like the rationals, with c² beyond. Infinitely many more galaxies lie between those drawn.

A number larger than every number

Ask for a number bigger than 0, bigger than 1, bigger than 2, and so on for ever. Every finite piece of that request is granted by an ordinary number, so compactness grants all of it at once — in a structure that satisfies every sentence true of the whole numbers and still contains something beyond all of them. Nothing in first-order logic can say 'and nothing else'.

logic · Models A countable structure grown by adding witnesses. Stages of a structure built from 0 and 1 by adding sums, products, negatives and roots of quadratics: 2, 4, 12, 158 elements between −3 and 3.

A countable field that passes for the line

The real numbers are uncountable, and every first-order sentence about their addition, multiplication and order is also true of a countable field inside them — the real algebraic numbers. Löwenheim and Skolem showed this is no quirk of the reals: every theory with an infinite model has a countable one, including set theory, which then contains sets it calls uncountable.

logic · Models A smallest model of ∀x (Ax → ∃y (By ∧ ¬Cy)) ∧ ∃x (Ax ∧ Cx) ∧ ∀x (Bx → ¬Ax). Three overlapping circles with some regions shaded as empty and a single dot in each occupied region, forming a model of a sentence of monadic first-order logic.

One thing in each region is enough

Give first-order logic its full apparatus of nested quantifiers but only one-place predicates, and every question about truth is still settled by the regions of a diagram. A predicate cannot tell apart two things in the same region, so no model ever needs more than one thing per region — and with three predicates there are only 255 models to try.

logic · Class diagrams The rationals and the dyadic fractions, matched 12 times without a crossing. Two number lines from 0 to 1, rationals above and dyadic fractions below, with 12 back-and-forth matchings: 1/2↔1/2, 1/3↔1/4, 2/3↔3/4, 1/4↔1/8, 3/4↔7/8, 2/5↔3/8, 1/5↔1/16, 3/5↔5/8, 4/5↔15/16, 2/7↔3/16, 1/6↔1/32, 3/8↔5/16.

Two lists that are one order

The rationals and the fractions with a power of two below are different sets of numbers, and as orders they are exactly the same — any two countable orders that are dense and have no ends can be matched, point for point, keeping every comparison. The proof is a zigzag, and it settles every question the language of order can ask.

logic · Models

Named alongside it

The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.

ConsistencyDecision procedureQuantifierElementary equivalenceExhaustive searchExpressive powerIndependenceAxiomAxiomatic set theoryCardinalityCompletenessCountability

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