Potential game
Named by 2 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
A best reply to the past
Let two players each answer the whole history of the other's play as though it were a fixed plan. In a zero-sum game the history closes in on the equilibrium, as Julia Robinson proved in 1951. In Lloyd Shapley's three-by-three game it never does: play runs round six profiles for ever, each run the one before plus the one three before plus two, so the runs grow by the real root of x³ = x² + 1 and every run is a fixed share of all the history.
Wanting a third, and getting three quarters
Two kinds of resident on a grid, each content if a third of its neighbours are of its own kind, each moving to a free square if not. Nobody objects to being in a minority; nobody asks for more than a third. When the moving stops, the average resident has three quarters of its neighbours of its own kind. Thomas Schelling's model shows an equilibrium nobody chose — and beside it a perfectly mixed city in which everyone is just as content, which the moving residents never find.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Nash equilibriumBest replyBest responseConvergence rateEquilibrium selectionMinimaxMixed strategyPeriodic orbitSimulationThresholdZero-sum game