Concept

Expectation

The average of a quantity's values, each weighted by how likely it is. It need not exist at all: for a heavy-tailed quantity the defining sum or integral diverges, and every argument using it fails.

Named by 41 essays across 9 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.

Waiting for all 6 kinds. One bar per new kind: the expected number of draws needed to see a kind not yet seen, rising as fewer of them are left, and adding to 14.70 draws in total.

How long until every one turns up

Draw at random from six equally likely kinds until all six have appeared. The wait is not six draws, and it is not sixty; it is fourteen point seven, and the number is a harmonic sum wearing a hat.

probability · Expectation
five values, unevenly weighted, and the mass outside 3 standard deviations. A distribution drawn as bars, with the windows one and a half, two and three standard deviations wide marked. The probability outside each window is summed and compared with the bound that knows only the variance.

How far from the average a thing can be

Knowing only an average and a spread — nothing about the shape, nothing about the number of outcomes, nothing about symmetry — the chance of landing three standard deviations out is at most one in nine. And there is a distribution that lands there exactly that often, so the bound cannot be improved.

probability · Concentration
One set of sums, two scalings, two different limits. The exact distribution of a sum of n independent copies, scaled two ways. Divided by n it collapses onto the mean; divided by the square root of n it holds a fixed width and settles into a shape.

The average settles and the wobble does not

Two theorems are usually met a page apart and sound as though one is a sharper version of the other. They are the same sums looked at through two different magnifying glasses: divide by the number of them and everything collapses to a point, divide by its square root and a shape appears.

probability · Central limit
5,040 orders, 7 thresholds, one best rule. For each number of candidates passed over, the share of the 5,040 possible arrival orders in which the rule ends up with the best of the 7. The count is exhaustive.

When to stop looking

Candidates arrive one at a time in a random order. Each must be accepted or rejected on the spot, with no going back and no way to know what is still to come. The best possible rule is to look at about a third of them and then take the first one that beats everything seen — and it works about a third of the time, however many there are.

probability · Optimal stopping
A walk with a barrier at each end. Three games played to absorption on a table of 12, beside the chance of ruin from each starting stake — a straight line, because the walk is fair.

Two barriers and a fair game

A fair walk between two absorbing barriers is ruined with a probability that is a straight line in the starting stake, and lasts for a number of steps that is the product of what each side can lose. Both facts come from the same two-line recurrence, and both are bad news for the smaller player.

probability · Random walk
Averages of a heavy-tailed quantity, which never settle. Running averages of draws from a Cauchy distribution, which jump rather than converge, beside the cumulative distributions of averages of 1, 4 and 16 draws, which lie on top of one another.

An average that never settles

The average of many independent quantities is supposed to steady as their number grows. For one famous distribution it does not steady at all — the average of a thousand draws has exactly the same distribution as a single draw, and no amount of further averaging changes it.

probability · Central limit
How fast a sum becomes a bell curve. The largest gap between the distribution of a standardised sum and the bell curve, against the number of terms, on logarithmic axes. Both summands fall along a line of slope about minus a half.

How fast the bell arrives

The limit theorem says a standardised sum approaches the bell curve and says nothing about when. The rate is one over the square root of the number of terms, the constant in front is made of the third moment, and both are visible.

probability · Central limit
The chance of being connected, against the chance of an edge. Curves of the exact probability that a random graph on three to six labelled points is connected, plotted against the probability of each individual edge.

The moment everything joins up

Add edges to a set of points one chance at a time and the graph goes from dust to a single piece — not gradually, but over a window that narrows as the point count grows. The last obstacle is almost always a single point with no edge at all, and that is what fixes where the change happens.

probability · Random graphs
Two unbiased estimates of one integral, and their spread. The sharply peaked integrand with the proposal density that follows it, above a strip plot of 200 estimates from each of two methods; the weighted estimates cluster 4.2 times more tightly about the same value.

Sampling where the answer lives

Monte Carlo error cannot be made to fall faster than the square root, so the only thing left to attack is the constant in front of it. Drawing points where the integrand is large, and dividing by how often they were drawn, leaves the answer alone and can shrink the noise many times over.

probability · Monte Carlo
The expected number of monochromatic sets, and where it drops below one. The logarithm of the expected number of single-coloured 4, 5, 6-point sets in a random two-colouring, plotted against the number of points, with the crossing of one marked for each.

The colouring nobody has ever seen

Count the monochromatic sets a random colouring is expected to contain. If the average is below one, some colouring has none — and the argument is finished, having produced nothing anyone can look at.

discrete · Ramsey theory
Which regions each rule favours. Average seats above or below exact quota for the largest and the smallest region, under each of the five methods, over 400 generated instances.

The rule with no favourites

Over four hundred instances, Jefferson's method gives the largest region a third of a seat more than its exact share and the smallest a third of a seat less. Adams reverses both. Webster's average is a hundredth of a seat, and that is not luck.

applied · Apportionment
A game that stops, over totals 0 to 5. States in a row with arrows up and down between them and the two ends absorbing, above a table of the expected number of steps and the chance of ending at the top from each start.

The chain that stops

Give a chain a state it cannot leave and there is no long run to find — every walk ends. What is worth computing instead is how long it lasts and where it finishes, and both are exact answers to a linear system rather than limits of anything.

probability · Markov chains
The time a single walk spends in each state, against the share it should hold. Paired bars for each state, one the fraction of a long run's time spent there and one the computed stationary share, above a table of expected return times.

The time spent and the share held

Stationary shares are a limit of distributions — where the walk probably is after many steps. Here the question is about a single walk: the fraction of its time spent in each state is that state's share, and the expected wait between visits is exactly the reciprocal.

probability · Markov chains
One walk on the whole numbers, three chances, three different fates. The relative weight of each state for three step-up chances, drawn as bars, with the running total of those weights and what each case means beneath.

Where the shares have nowhere to go

On finitely many states, a chain that can reach everywhere and is not forced into a rhythm settles down. Give it infinitely many and both conditions can hold while the walk leaves and never returns — or returns with certainty and takes an unbounded average time about it.

probability · Markov chains
Downhill on average, and never on purpose. The logarithms of 4 Collatz orbits plotted against step number, each wandering upward and downward and each ending at one. A separate sample of four thousand starts gives an average fall of -0.15 per step.

The heuristic that cannot be a proof

There is a two-line argument that the Collatz conjecture is true, it is convincing, and everybody who works on the problem believes it. It also cannot be turned into a proof, and understanding exactly where it fails is more instructive than the argument itself.

dynamics · Collatz
The moment a giant piece appears. The largest component's share of 900 points plotted against the average degree, with the measured values as dots and the predicted curve behind them. The curve is flat at zero below an average degree of one and rises steeply above it.

The moment a giant appears

Raise the chance of an edge slowly and a random graph does nothing for a long time, then in a narrow window acquires a component holding a definite fraction of everything. The fraction is the root of an equation, and the equation says why the transition is where it is.

probability · Random graphs
One piece, and connected, are different thresholds. Two curves against the average degree for graphs of 400 points: the largest component's share, rising from an average degree of one, and the probability of connectivity, rising only near the logarithm of the point count.

Two thresholds, not one

A random graph acquires a piece holding most of its points at average degree one, and is still not connected. Connectivity waits until the average degree reaches the logarithm of the size, and what holds it up is the very last isolated point.

probability · Random graphs
A triangle appears when the count says it should. The measured probability of containing a triangle against the edge chance, on graphs of 200 points, beside the expected number of triangles capped at one.

Finding a threshold with two moments

Every monotone property of a random graph has a threshold, and locating one is nearly always the same two calculations — count what the property needs, and check the count does not concentrate on rare cases. The triangle is where the method is cleanest.

probability · Random graphs
58.6% at 46 candidates, against 37% without the values. The chance of ending with the best candidate when the values are shown, against the number of candidates, for 10 sizes. It falls towards 0.5802 rather than towards 1/e.

When the numbers are shown

The secretary rule wins a third of the time and cannot do better, because it is told only who is ahead. Show the actual values and say where they came from, and the same problem is won three times in five — by a standard that falls as the end approaches.

probability · Optimal stopping
About the fourth-best, whatever the size of the field. The smallest expected rank achievable by an online rule, against the number of candidates, for 10 sizes. It rises to 3.8516 at 2500 candidates and its limit is 3.8695.

Giving up on the best

The secretary rule treats landing the second-best exactly as badly as landing the worst, which is a strange thing to want. Ask instead for the smallest average rank and the answer is about the fourth-best candidate — whatever the size of the field, and whether it is ten or ten million.

probability · Optimal stopping
An online rule taking nine tenths of what an oracle takes. The share of the oracle's expected maximum secured by the best single threshold, and by the threshold at the median of the maximum, for 8 field sizes of independent uniform values.

Half of what an oracle takes

Compare an online rule not against the best it could have done but against a rule that has seen every value in advance. One fixed threshold secures half of what the oracle collects, whatever the distributions are — and there is an example on which half is all there is.

probability · Optimal stopping
The most mass 2 deviations out, with only a mean and a variance. The distribution putting as much probability as possible outside a window 2 standard deviations wide, found by searching every triple of support points, with the quadratic certificate that bounds it drawn over.

The bound is the answer to a search

Chebyshev's inequality is not a clever estimate that happens to be sharp. It is the exact answer to a maximisation over all distributions with a stated mean and variance, and the polynomial that proves nothing beats it is the certificate a search of that kind always produces.

probability · Concentration
What one input can do, over 1024 cases. A table of functions of several inputs with the largest effect any single input has on each, the bound that effect implies, and the true tail probability — computed by enumerating every input.

No single input can move it far

Independence was never the hypothesis doing the work. A quantity built from many separately drawn inputs concentrates whenever changing one of them moves it only a little — and that covers quantities which are not sums of anything and have no formula at all.

probability · Concentration
Waiting for all 6 when they are not equally likely. One bar per kind giving the expected wait for that kind on its own, with the rarest much the tallest, and the expected wait for the whole collection printed above them.

The one that hardly ever comes up

Make the kinds unequally likely and the tidy decomposition into stages fails, because a stage's rate now depends on which kinds turned up rather than on how many. What replaces it is an alternating sum over every subset — and the rarest kind turns out to be nearly the whole answer.

probability · Expectation
How long 4 equally likely patterns take to appear. A bar for each of 4 patterns of 3 coin tosses giving the expected number of tosses before it first appears, with the lengths at which each pattern overlaps itself listed.

Two patterns, one chance, different waits

HTH and HTT are equally likely in any given window of three tosses. Waiting for HTH takes ten tosses on average and waiting for HTT takes eight, and the difference is not about probability at all — it is about what a failed attempt leaves behind.

probability · Expectation
Fair bits from a biased coin. 44 flips of a coin biased 0.7 towards 1, read in 22 pairs. Mixed pairs are kept and give their first bit; matched pairs are discarded. Over a long run the output is 50.2% ones, at 0.210 output bits per flip.

Fair bits from an unfair coin

Read a biased coin's flips in pairs, keep 01 as 0 and 10 as 1, and throw away the rest: the output is exactly fair, whatever the bias, and nobody needs to know the bias. The trick wastes most of the coin, the waste can be recycled almost up to the ceiling Shannon's entropy sets — and it fails quietly the moment the flips remember each other.

computation · Pseudorandomness
One experiment, measured by runs and by awakenings. Two unit squares for the same coin and the same schedule: the same experiment weighed two ways: by runs, heads keeps half the square; by awakenings, heads is one of 3 equal slices.

One coin, counted by runs and by wakings

Beauty is put to sleep and a fair coin is tossed. Heads, she is woken once; tails, twice, with the first waking erased from her memory. Each time she wakes she is asked how likely heads is. One half, say some; one third, say others; and unlike every earlier puzzle of this kind, stating the protocol exactly does not end the argument.

probability · Bayes
A random pairing of 24 edges. Chord diagram of one uniformly random pairing of a 24-gon's edges, corners coloured by the vertex they become. a 24-gon with its edges paired at random and glued head to tail: the 24 corners fall into 3 vertices, so the surface has genus 5, against a most possible of 6.

The surface a random gluing makes

Pair the edges of a large polygon at random and glue each pair head to tail. The surface almost always has nearly as many handles as the polygon allows: a thousand edges leave about seven and a half vertices, and the genus is within four of its ceiling of 250. The vertices behave like the cycles of a random permutation, and their average is a harmonic number.

topology · Surface classification
Measuring a closed curve with inlets by throwing lines at it. A curve inside a disc crossed by a sample of random lines with each crossing marked, beside the mean number of crossings and the length it implies against the true length.

A length counted by the lines that cross it

Throw straight lines at random across a curve and count how often they cross it. The average count, times π times the radius of the target, is the curve's length — for a wiggly closed curve, a spiral or a snowflake alike, with no following of the curve and no derivative anywhere. It is Crofton's formula of 1868, and it measures length the way a map-reader's ruled transparency does.

analysis · Arc length
The ground a 1,500-step walk covers. A random walk on a square grid drawn as a path, with every grid square it visited shaded and its start and end marked.

The ground a walk covers

A random walk of a thousand steps visits far fewer than a thousand places: in one dimension about fifty, in the plane about four hundred, in space about six hundred and sixty. The share of steps that land on new ground is exactly the chance of never coming home — so the number that decides whether a walker returns also decides how much of the world it sees.

probability · Random walk
A random labelled tree on 60 points. A tree drawn in horizontal layers by distance from a root point, with the leaves coloured differently from the internal points.

A random tree is one part in e leaves

Choose a labelled tree on n points uniformly at random. A point is a leaf exactly when its label never appears in the tree's Prüfer code, so the share of leaves is (1 − 1/n)^(n − 2) — half the points for a tree on four, 36.8% for a large one, the reciprocal of e. The whole degree distribution follows the same way: one plus a Poisson count with mean one.

discrete · Labelled trees
Who does well in a random market, as it grows. A log-log plot of the average rank of partner for the proposing side and the receiving side of random balanced markets against the market's size, with dashed curves for ln n and n over ln n.

One extra person on one side

In a random market of a thousand a side, whoever proposes gets about their seventh choice and whoever receives gets about their hundred-and-fortieth. Add one person to one side and the advantage of proposing all but disappears: the shorter side does well and the longer side badly, whichever side proposes, and most people are left with exactly one stable partner.

applied · Stable matching
How much the first player can guarantee, as the coin's bias moves. A plot of the first player's best guaranteed winning chance in Penney's game against the probability of heads, a third on a fair coin and rising past one half only when the coin is heavily biased.

A coin that lets the first player win

On a fair coin the second player in Penney's game always has a better pattern than the first, and the first can hold them to no worse than two to one. Bend the coin and every overlap is paid for in the letters it uses: the replies change, the first player's share swings between a third and a half, and past a heads chance of 1/∛2 the first player simply names HHH and wins.

probability · Expectation
Three patterns that beat one another in a circle: HHHT, TTHH, HTTH. Three coin-toss patterns at the corners of a triangle with arrows showing which beats which in two-way races, and each pattern's chance of winning when all three race.

Three patterns in a circle

Race three coin patterns at once and the gamblers' accounting still gives each one's chance of arriving first — one fairness equation per pattern. What it does not give is any way to read the three-way result off the two-way ones. HHHT, TTHH and HTTH beat one another in a circle, and HHH loses both its head-to-head races and still finishes ahead of one of the patterns that beat it.

probability · Expectation
Switching envelopes when the largest amount is 64. A bar chart of the probability-weighted gain from switching at each amount that might be seen, 1 to 64: small positive bars and one large negative bar, adding to zero.

The envelope that always looks better

Two envelopes, one holding twice as much as the other. Open one, see an amount, and reason that the other holds double or half with equal chance — so switching gains a quarter on average. By symmetry the same argument says switch back. The step that fails is not the arithmetic; it is the claim that double and half are equally likely whatever amount is seen, which no honest prior allows — and there is one prior under which the other envelope really does look better at every amount.

probability · Bayes
A random ranking on the triangular graph, 8 a side. A bipartite graph in which arrival t is joined to places t through 8. One random ranking of the places is used to match greedily; 5 of 8 arrivals are matched.

Matching as they arrive

Applicants arrive one at a time, and each must be given a post or turned away on the spot. Any sensible rule matches at least half as many as the best assignment chosen with hindsight, and an adversary arranging the arrivals can hold every fixed rule to exactly half. Shuffle the posts once, at random, and give each arrival its best-ranked free post: the guarantee rises to 1 − 1/e, about 63%, and no rule of any kind can do better.

discrete · Halls theorem
What a rule collects when every value comes from the same distribution. uniform on [0, 1]: best rule 0.995, one threshold 0.635 of E[max] at n = 200; exponential: best rule 0.905, one threshold 0.678 of E[max] at n = 200; Pareto, tail exponent 2: best rule 0.802, one threshold 0.714 of E[max] at n = 200; Pareto, tail exponent 1.2: best rule 0.802, one threshold 0.682 of E[max] at n = 200.

When every value comes from the same hat

A rule that sees values one at a time and must keep or discard each on the spot can guarantee half of what a prophet collects, and no more, when the values come from different distributions. When they all come from the same one, the guarantee rises to 0.745 — and a single fixed threshold, set so that each value crosses it with chance 1/n, already secures 1 − 1/e. For bounded values the best rule collects nearly everything; only a heavy tail, where one enormous value carries the prize, keeps the gap open.

probability · Optimal stopping
The expected rank a threshold rule achieves with the values shown, against what is known. n=1: 1.0000 (c=4.000); n=2: 1.2500 (c=1.000); n=3: 1.4009 (c=1.124); n=5: 1.5868 (c=1.257); n=10: 1.8141 (c=1.416); n=20: 1.9950 (c=1.555); n=50: 2.1557 (c=1.701); n=100: 2.2284 (c=1.781); n=200: 2.2725 (c=1.838); n=400: 2.2983 (c=1.877); n=800: 2.3130 (c=1.902).

The rank that remembers every value

Values arrive one at a time, each must be kept or discarded on the spot, and the aim is to keep one whose rank among all of them is low on average. Told only who is leading, the best rule gets 3.87. Shown the values, a rule gets below 2.33 — and how much lower the best possible rule goes is not known, because the rank of what is kept depends on every value seen, and the best rule may need to remember all of them.

probability · Optimal stopping
The roots of random polynomials of degree 30 and 100: few are real. degree 30: 2 real roots at -2.335, -1.074; degree 100: 2 real roots at -0.327, 0.994.

Almost none of the roots are real

Pick the coefficients of a polynomial of degree a thousand at random, each one an independent draw from the bell curve, and ask how many of its thousand roots are real. The answer is about five. Mark Kac found in 1943 that the average grows only like (2/π) ln n, and the reason can be read off the real line itself: the real roots crowd towards +1 and −1 and spread evenly on a logarithmic scale of distance from them.

algebra · Polynomial roots
A random walk across the regions to the one that satisfies every clause. Four overlapping ellipses with a dot in each of their sixteen regions, one marked as the only assignment satisfying the clauses, and a path of arrows from a random starting region to it, each arrow crossing one ellipse.

A walk that beats trying everything

To decide whether clauses of three letters can all be satisfied, the obvious method tries all 2ⁿ assignments. Uwe Schöning's method, from 1999, starts at a random assignment and wanders: pick a clause that is false, flip one of its letters at random, and repeat three times as many times as there are letters. A single try usually fails, but it succeeds with chance at least about (3/4)ⁿ, so about (4/3)ⁿ tries are enough — and the reason is a walk on a line that goes the wrong way two times in three.

logic · Class diagrams
What a seller collects under first-price and second-price rules. Histograms of 20000 simulated revenues with 3 uniform bidders: second-price mean 0.4988, variance 0.0497; first-price mean 0.4995, variance 0.0167.

Two auctions that earn the same

In one sealed-bid auction the winner pays its own bid; in the other it pays the second-highest bid. Bidders behave completely differently — in the second they bid what the object is worth to them, in the first they shade their bids down by exactly a fraction — and the seller's revenue is spread differently. Yet the seller expects to collect precisely the same amount, (n − 1)/(n + 1) for n bidders with values spread evenly, and so does an auction in which everybody pays. The equality breaks the moment bidders dislike risk, and it says nothing about how much a reserve price can add.

applied · Equilibrium

Named alongside it

The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.

Random walkConditional probabilityVarianceConvergence rateMarkov chainIndependenceIrrevocable decisionOptimal stoppingThreshold ruleDecision procedureHarmonic seriesNormal distribution

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