Conditional probability
Named by 16 essays across 2 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
Bayes' theorem is a picture of a square
A test that is 99% accurate returns a positive result. The chance it is right can easily be under one in five, and the reason is visible the moment the population is drawn as a square rather than described as a formula.
The door that was not opened
Three doors, one prize, a host who opens a losing door and offers a swap. Switching wins two times in three, and the reason is not about doors — it is about what the host was allowed to do.
When to stop looking
Candidates arrive one at a time in a random order. Each must be accepted or rejected on the spot, with no going back and no way to know what is still to come. The best possible rule is to look at about a third of them and then take the first one that beats everything seen — and it works about a third of the time, however many there are.
A signal both can see
Two choosers who randomise privately can reach a set of outcomes that is smaller, and worse, than the set they reach when a device draws one cell and whispers each of them their half of it. Nothing is enforced and nobody is bound, and the arrangement is stable anyway.
Two equilibria and no way to choose
A game can have two states nobody wants to leave, one paying more than the other, and the definition of an equilibrium has nothing to say about which happens. The two standard tie-breakers disagree, and the one that wins is usually the worse.
When the numbers are shown
The secretary rule wins a third of the time and cannot do better, because it is told only who is ahead. Show the actual values and say where they came from, and the same problem is won three times in five — by a standard that falls as the end approaches.
Giving up on the best
The secretary rule treats landing the second-best exactly as badly as landing the worst, which is a strange thing to want. Ask instead for the smallest average rank and the answer is about the fourth-best candidate — whatever the size of the field, and whether it is ten or ten million.
Half of what an oracle takes
Compare an online rule not against the best it could have done but against a rule that has seen every value in advance. One fixed threshold secures half of what the oracle collects, whatever the distributions are — and there is an example on which half is all there is.
Add the odds from the end
Watch a sequence of independent events and try to stop exactly on the last one that happens. Add up the odds of the events from the end backwards until the total reaches one, and stop at the first success from there. That rule is the best possible for any probabilities whatever, and the secretary problem is the special case in which the chances are one over the position.
The reading that is almost right
Every account of simultaneous choice so far has assumed the payoffs are known to both choosers and known to be known. Replace that with each chooser seeing a private reading off by a little, and a band of equilibria closes to a single point — so the assumption nobody states decides the answer.
Two patterns, one chance, different waits
HTH and HTT are equally likely in any given window of three tosses. Waiting for HTH takes ten tosses on average and waiting for HTT takes eight, and the difference is not about probability at all — it is about what a failed attempt leaves behind.
Two children and the sentence about one of them
A family has two children and at least one is a boy. The chance that both are boys is one in three — or one in two, or anything from one in three to certainty — and every one of those answers is right for some way the sentence could have come to be said. There is no host and no door, and the protocol is still the whole problem.
One coin, counted by runs and by wakings
Beauty is put to sleep and a fair coin is tossed. Heads, she is woken once; tails, twice, with the first waking erased from her memory. Each time she wakes she is asked how likely heads is. One half, say some; one third, say others; and unlike every earlier puzzle of this kind, stating the protocol exactly does not end the argument.
A coin that lets the first player win
On a fair coin the second player in Penney's game always has a better pattern than the first, and the first can hold them to no worse than two to one. Bend the coin and every overlap is paid for in the letters it uses: the replies change, the first player's share swings between a third and a half, and past a heads chance of 1/∛2 the first player simply names HHH and wins.
Evidence measured in decibans
Write a probability as odds and take the logarithm, and every piece of evidence becomes a length. A positive result on a good test is thirteen decibans; a negative one is minus twenty. Lay the lengths end to end from the prior and the posterior is where they stop, in any order. The rule fails in exactly one way — when two pieces of evidence share a cause — and Turing built a code-breaking method on the arithmetic.
The envelope that always looks better
Two envelopes, one holding twice as much as the other. Open one, see an amount, and reason that the other holds double or half with equal chance — so switching gains a quarter on average. By symmetry the same argument says switch back. The step that fails is not the arithmetic; it is the claim that double and half are equally likely whatever amount is seen, which no honest prior allows — and there is one prior under which the other envelope really does look better at every amount.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
ExpectationBayes' theoremCounting argumentOptimal stoppingThreshold ruleAreaDecision procedureIrrevocable decisionSample spaceBackward inductionBest replyCorrelated equilibrium