Countability
Named by 14 essays across 3 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
The row that is not on the list
Write down a list of infinite sequences, any list at all, and there is a rule that builds a sequence missing from it. The rule reads one entry from each row, and it is the single most reused argument in this field.
Two injections make a bijection
If each of two collections fits inside the other without collisions, they are the same size. That sounds obvious and is not, because neither injection needs to be onto — and the proof is a rule for deciding which of the two to follow, one chain at a time.
The arithmetic that loses subtraction
Adding one to an infinite collection changes nothing, and neither does doubling it, or squaring it. What that costs is the two operations that were doing the work — an equation between infinite sizes cannot be cancelled, and how many are left stops being a question.
Countable, and everywhere
The numbers a polynomial can catch arrive in finite batches, so they can be listed. They are also in every interval, however short. Being listable turns out to say nothing whatever about being sparse.
Every ordinal in base omega
Every ordinal below a certain point is a descending sum of powers of ω, in exactly one way. That notation makes comparison mechanical, it is what hereditary base notation becomes when the base is replaced, and it stops at the first ordinal it cannot name.
Reached from below, or not at all
Every limit ordinal anybody meets is the end of an increasing sequence — ω, ω·2, ω^ω, all of them approached one step at a time. The first uncountable ordinal is not, and the reason it is not constrains the size of the continuum.
Covering a set from outside
To say how long a set is, cover it with intervals and add their lengths, then take the smallest total any covering achieves. That definition is short, obviously right for an interval, and gives the rationals a length of nothing.
A set that has no size at all
Slide the unit interval along itself by every rational and the points fall into classes. Choose one point from each and the resulting set has no length — not zero, not positive, none: countably many disjoint copies of it would have total length nought or infinity, and the union needs something in between.
Every rational in one sequence
The tree lists every positive fraction once and needs a tree to do it. One recursion on the whole numbers lists them in a single row — and each term of it counts something nobody was asking about, which is why the enumeration works.
A countable field that passes for the line
The real numbers are uncountable, and every first-order sentence about their addition, multiplication and order is also true of a countable field inside them — the real algebraic numbers. Löwenheim and Skolem showed this is no quirk of the reals: every theory with an infinite model has a countable one, including set theory, which then contains sets it calls uncountable.
The word that cannot describe itself
Some adjectives describe themselves — 'short' is short — and some do not — 'lengthy' is not lengthy. Call the second kind heterological, and ask whether 'heterological' is heterological. It is exactly when it is not. The diagonal that beat every list of numbers, every set of sets and every provability predicate has been turned on words that describe words, and it proves that no language can contain a word for its own notion of describing, naming or truth.
Two lists that are one order
The rationals and the fractions with a power of two below are different sets of numbers, and as orders they are exactly the same — any two countable orders that are dense and have no ends can be matched, point for point, keeping every comparison. The proof is a zigzag, and it settles every question the language of order can ask.
What counting can prove exists
There are only as many continuous functions as points of a line, only as many Borel sets, only countably many definitions — and more sets of reals than any of those. So counting proves that discontinuous functions, non-Borel sets and undefinable numbers exist without exhibiting one. It cannot prove that a set with no length exists, because the sets that have a length are exactly as numerous as all sets, and that difference turns out to be the difference between what the axioms force and what they merely allow.
Closed sets obey the continuum hypothesis
Whether some set of reals is bigger than the whole numbers and smaller than the line is a question the axioms cannot answer. For closed sets it has an answer, found in 1883: strip away the isolated points, again and again, and what is left is either nothing or a perfect set, which is as large as the line — so every closed set is countable or of the line's size. The same answer holds for Borel and analytic sets, and fails to be provable exactly one step further up.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
CardinalityBijectionMeasure zeroAxiom of choiceOrdinalAlgebraic numberCantor setDense setDiagonal argumentElementary equivalenceHilbert hotelInterval