Concept

Weighted voting

A voting rule in which each member casts a fixed number of votes and a motion passes when the votes for it reach a quota. A member's power to decide outcomes need not follow its share of the votes, and can even be zero.

Named by 4 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.

A share of the votes, and a share of the power. Three weighted assemblies, each with the members' share of the votes beside their share of the power counted two independent ways.

A share of the votes is not a share of the power

Give three members four, four and one vote, with five needed to pass. Every winning coalition needs exactly two of them, so all three have equal power — and one of them holds a ninth of the votes.

applied · Shapley value
Luxembourg's votes and Luxembourg's power, 1958 to 1995. Paired bars for Luxembourg at five enlargements of the Council: vote share falling and power share rising from nothing in 1958 to 0.95% in 1973 and 3.02% in 1981.

A vote worth nothing until it was outnumbered

From 1958 to 1973 Luxembourg held one vote of seventeen in the Council of the European Communities and could never once change an outcome. When the Council grew, Luxembourg's share of the votes fell and its share of the power rose from nothing. Power is not a quantity a member holds; it is a property of the whole assembly, and changing the assembly moves it in directions nobody would guess.

applied · Shapley value
A block of shares in an ocean of small holders. a=0.02: exact 0.0249, limit 0.0204; a=0.06: exact 0.0647, limit 0.0638; a=0.1: exact 0.1144, limit 0.1111; a=0.14: exact 0.1642, limit 0.1628; a=0.18: exact 0.2139, limit 0.2195; a=0.22: exact 0.2836, limit 0.2821; a=0.26: exact 0.3532, limit 0.3514; a=0.3: exact 0.4229, limit 0.4286; a=0.34: exact 0.5124, limit 0.5152; a=0.38: exact 0.6119, limit 0.6129; a=0.42: exact 0.7214, limit 0.7241; a=0.46: exact 0.8507, limit 0.8519; a=0.5: exact 0.9950, limit 1.0000; a=0.54: exact 1.0000, limit 1.0000; a=0.58: exact 1.0000, limit 1.0000

A block in an ocean of small holders

A shareholder with 30% of a company whose other shares are scattered among thousands of small holders has, by the average over every order of arrival, 43% of the power to decide — 3/7 exactly, in the limit. The reason is a window of moments: if everyone arrives at a random time, the dispersed shares trickle in at a steady rate, and the block decides every vote in which it turns up while the trickle sits within 30% of the quota. The same picture, run along a diagonal, turns the average over orders into an integral and puts the two classic power indices on one curve.

applied · Shapley value
Whose vote counts in a two-tier election. Relative chance a voter decides a two-tier vote, districts 9,25,49,81,121,169,225. one vote per district: 2.319 1.367 0.971 0.754 0.616 0.521 0.452. weight in proportion to voters: 0.501 0.296 0.630 0.815 1.466 1.240 2.051. weight in proportion to √voters: 1.021 1.003 0.998 0.996 0.995 0.994 0.994.

A vote worth a square root

Give each country in a council votes in proportion to its people, and a citizen of the largest has about fifteen times the say of a citizen of the smallest. Give each country one vote and the same ratio runs the other way. Lionel Penrose saw in 1946 that the fair weight is the square root of the population, because one voter's chance of deciding an election falls as one over the square root of the crowd. Computed for twenty-seven states, the best quota is 61.5%, and it holds the ratio to 1.006.

applied · Shapley value

Named alongside it

The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.

CoalitionBanzhaf indexMarginal contributionQuotaShapley valueApportionmentBinomial coefficientCentral limit theoremCooperative gameCounterexampleDummy playerExhaustive search

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