Concept

Quota — where it appears

A region's exact share of the seats being divided — its population times the house size, over the total — which is almost never a whole number. A rule respects quota when every region ends with the floor or the ceiling of its own, and the classical divisor methods do not.

Named by 8 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.

A share of the votes, and a share of the power. Three weighted assemblies, each with the members' share of the votes beside their share of the power counted two independent ways.

A share of the votes is not a share of the power

Give three members four, four and one vote, with five needed to pass. Every winning coalition needs exactly two of them, so all three have equal power — and one of them holds a ninth of the votes.

applied · Shapley value
Five rules, one dial. Seats for each of 5 regions at 21 settings of the rounding threshold, with the three settings that are the named methods marked; the largest region gains and the smallest loses as the threshold rises.

Five rules and one dial

Adams, Webster and Jefferson are usually taught as three rules for rounding a share. They are one rule with a number in it, and turning that number from nought to one moves seats from the smallest region to the largest, one at a time.

applied · Apportionment
Which regions each rule favours. Average seats above or below exact quota for the largest and the smallest region, under each of the five methods, over 400 generated instances.

The rule with no favourites

Over four hundred instances, Jefferson's method gives the largest region a third of a seat more than its exact share and the smallest a third of a seat less. Adams reverses both. Webster's average is a hundredth of a seat, and that is not luck.

applied · Apportionment
Two out of three, and never all three. A table of the five apportionment methods against three properties, each cell decided by a search over generated instances; no method has all three.

Two out of three, and never all three

Stay inside every region's quota, never take a seat away when the house grows, never take one from a region that grew faster. Each pair is achievable. All three together are not, and the proof is that no rule anywhere manages it.

applied · Apportionment
What each rule is answering. A table of five apportionments against three measures of inequality between two regions, with a tick where no transfer of a seat reduces the measure; each measure certifies exactly one of the five.

Choosing what unfair means

Ask whether moving one seat between two regions would make them more equal, and the answer depends on what "equal" is measured in. Three measures, three different answers, and each of the classical methods is the one no transfer can improve for exactly one of them.

applied · Apportionment
Biproportional seats against their fair shares. A table of votes for 3 districts and 4 parties beside the seats the biproportional method gives, each with the fair share from the continuous fit, and the cell whose seats fall outside its quota marked.

The table inside every quota

Give seats to districts and parties at once, and every cell of the table has a fair share it ought to round from. A table rounding every cell to its floor or its ceiling, with every total exact, always exists. The biproportional method does not always choose one: here it gives a party 2 seats where its fair share is 3.088.

applied · Apportionment
Sixteen halves in a three-by-three-by-three table of seats. A three-way table of fair shares drawn as three slices, one per group, with sixteen cells holding a half and every line total, along districts, parties and groups, equal to zero or one.

Where the rounding runs out

In two dimensions a table of seats inside every fair share always exists. Add a third family of totals — every district and party split between groups — and it need not. Sixteen halves in a three-by-three-by-three table meet every total, and no whole table does it without a seat where the fair share is nothing, because the halves close a loop of seven.

applied · Apportionment
Luxembourg's votes and Luxembourg's power, 1958 to 1995. Paired bars for Luxembourg at five enlargements of the Council: vote share falling and power share rising from nothing in 1958 to 0.95% in 1973 and 3.02% in 1981.

A vote worth nothing until it was outnumbered

From 1958 to 1973 Luxembourg held one vote of seventeen in the Council of the European Communities and could never once change an outcome. When the Council grew, Luxembourg's share of the votes fell and its share of the power rose from nothing. Power is not a quantity a member holds; it is a property of the whole assembly, and changing the assembly moves it in directions nobody would guess.

applied · Shapley value

Named alongside it

The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.

ApportionmentDivisor methodCounterexampleMonotonicityRoundingExhaustive searchGeometric meanImpossibilityCounting argumentExistence proofMarginal contributionParity

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