Model misspecification
Named by 2 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
Also named here as posterior — the same set of essays touches all of them, so they are one junction rather than several.
Certain of a coin that is not there
Bayes' theorem is exact, and it is only as good as the list of hypotheses it is given. Hand it a list that leaves out the truth and it does not hesitate: it becomes certain of the entry that is least wrong, in a precise sense — the one closest in Kullback–Leibler divergence — and if two entries are equally wrong it never settles at all. Hand it a model that assumes independence where there is none, and its intervals shrink as fast as they would for honest data while covering the truth less and less often.
A result at five per cent that favours the null
Toss a coin a million times and find a count of heads exactly at the edge of significance, p = 0.05. A test at the usual level rejects fairness. A Bayes factor comparing a fair coin with a coin of unknown bias says the opposite, by 117 to one. Both computations are right, and the sample size that separates them is about seventy-six tosses.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Bayes' theoremPosteriorBayes factorCentral limit theoremCoverageCredible intervalIndependenceLikelihoodP valueRandom walkRelative entropy