Dominant strategy
Named by 4 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
The value from both sides
Two choosers move at the same instant, and each asks the cautious question — how much can be guaranteed, whatever the other does. With pure choices the two answers are usually different numbers; allow a probability and they are forced to be the same one.
The road that makes everyone later
An equilibrium is a state nobody can improve alone, which is a much weaker thing than a state anybody would choose. Adding a link that costs nothing to use makes every traveller in this network strictly slower, and the arithmetic says by exactly how much.
Worth more for being seen first
Moving first sounds like a disadvantage, since the other side gets to see the move and answer it. When the move is a mixture that is announced and believed, it is never a disadvantage, it is worth exactly nothing in a game of pure conflict, and in other games it is worth more than any equilibrium — sometimes by announcing an action that would never be played in secret.
The reading that is almost right
Every account of simultaneous choice so far has assumed the payoffs are known to both choosers and known to be known. Replace that with each chooser seeing a private reading off by a little, and a band of equilibria closes to a single point — so the assumption nobody states decides the answer.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Nash equilibriumBest replyMixed strategyConvexityEquilibrium selectionExistence proofMinimaxZero-sum gameBraess paradoxCommitmentConditional probabilityConvergence