Condorcet cycle
Named by 10 essays across one field — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
The majority that goes in a circle
Every voter hands in a ranking, and a ranking is transitive by construction. Compare the candidates two at a time and let the majority decide each pair, and the verdicts need not fit together into a ranking at all.
Five rules and five winners
Twenty-seven ranked ballots, five entirely reasonable ways of counting them, and five different candidates declared the winner. Every count is correct, every rule is defensible, and the answer turns out to be a property of the rule rather than of the ballots.
Four conditions, and no rule that has all of them
Five reasonable rules can return five different winners on one set of ballots, which invites the obvious question of which one is right. The answer is that the conditions anybody would write down cannot all hold at once — and here each named rule's own violation is found by search rather than quoted.
A lie that pays
A ballot is usually read as a report of a preference. This one reads it as a move, and walks every move one voter has — all six rankings, the winner each produces, and the ones that beat honesty.
The nearest consistent verdict
When a court's majorities contradict each other, one repair is to announce the consistent verdict that disagrees with the judges least. It treats the premises and the conclusion alike, which neither of the two standard procedures does. On the classic case it returns a three-way tie; on five judges, with every question weighted equally, it never returns a single answer on a troubled profile at all — and what breaks the tie is a decision about which question matters more.
Agendas that cannot contradict themselves
A court voting on two unconnected questions never contradicts itself, and neither does one voting on a chain of thresholds. A court voting on two premises and their conjunction sometimes does. What separates them is the size of the smallest sets of judgements that cannot all be true: pairs are harmless, because two majorities always share a judge, and triples are not. The same count says exactly how large a supermajority has to be to stay consistent on any agenda.
How often the majority goes in a circle
Three voters and three candidates give 216 profiles, and 12 of them are cycles. Count every electorate up to 41 voters exactly and the share climbs towards 8.77%, a number Guilbaud found in 1952 as the solid angle where three half-spaces at the tetrahedral angle overlap. Add candidates and a winner goes missing half the time; let voters share one axis and cycles vanish. The number is always a property of the model of how ballots are drawn.
What the agenda leaves standing
Ask for a rule that settles each question from the votes on that question, follows a unanimous court and never contradicts itself, and search every such rule for three judges. On a ranking of three options, three survive: one dictator per judge. On two premises and their conjunction, seven survive: every rule in which a fixed set of judges must all agree. On a chain of thresholds, a hundred and twenty-nine, majority among them. The difference is not in the rules. It is in which answers force which, and whether that forcing ever runs back.
How often the rules find the majority favourite
When one candidate beats every rival head to head, a voting rule ought to elect it. Plurality does about three times in four when every ranking is equally likely, the runoff between the top two 96 times in a hundred, Borda's count 90. Every profile of up to 51 voters is counted exactly, the limit is sampled, and adding candidates pulls plurality down below one half.
A chain of majorities leads anywhere
Put voters on a line and the middle one's position beats everything. Put five in a plane and nothing is safe: seven majority votes can walk the group from its own centre to a place every one of them likes less. One small circle, drawn through the lines that split the voters, says exactly how far a single vote can go, and it shrinks as the group grows.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Pairwise majorityVoting ruleExhaustive searchPreference profileCounterexampleImpossibility theoremJudgement aggregationMajority ruleBorda countCondorcet winnerIndependence of irrelevant alternativesNormal distribution