The collection

Every essay — page 25

Page 25 of 25, continuing through the fields in the same order.

Geometry Analysis Algebra Discrete Topology Probability Number Dynamics Logic Computation Applied What's new Series Concepts Search

Applied

A rule for choosing, stated exactly, and what it forces on whoever adopts it.

The band two equilibria occupy, and the point a noisy reading leaves. A line of values of the payoff parameter with three regions marked — staying out dominant, both actions equilibria, investing dominant — and a single threshold inside the middle region.

The reading that is almost right

Every account of simultaneous choice so far has assumed the payoffs are known to both choosers and known to be known. Replace that with each chooser seeing a private reading off by a little, and a band of equilibria closes to a single point — so the assumption nobody states decides the answer.

6 figures
Even and Paz's halving, for 4 people. The recursive halving procedure run on a cake valued differently by 4 people: each round's marks and cuts, and the final pieces, each worth at least a 1/4 share to its owner. 8 marks are made.

How many cuts a fair share costs

Every person can be guaranteed a share of a cake worth at least one n-th by their own measure, and the oldest rule that does it asks about n²/2 questions. Splitting the people into halves and the cake at a median mark asks about n log n — and a theorem says nothing can ask fewer. Fairness has a price, and it can be counted.

5 figures
Maximising the product of two people's values. The frontier of value pairs from dividing 4 goods between two people, with the points maximising the product, the sum and the smaller value. The product's maximum is (65.0, 54.2) and is envy-free.

The product that makes a division fair

Divide goods to make the total happiness as large as possible and the result can be monstrously unfair; make the least happy person as happy as possible and it can waste. Multiply the people's values together and maximise the product instead, and something unexpected happens — nobody envies anybody when goods can be split, and nobody envies by more than one item when they cannot.

6 figures
Every stable matching leaves out the same people. 4 stable matchings of a market with short lists, drawn as two columns joined by edges; every one leaves the same letter and number unmatched.

The people every stable answer leaves out

Let the lists be short and let one side take several partners. Stable matchings still exist and there can be many of them — but every one leaves out exactly the same people, and a member who is left with an empty place holds exactly the same partners in every one. A three-line count proves it.

5 figures
The odd ring that forbids a stable pairing. The ranked lists of 6 people and a stable partition of them drawn on a circle: pairs as plain chords, a ring of three or more as arrows from each person to the one they hold. An odd ring is present, as it is in every stable partition of this instance.

A ring that no pairing can break

Put everybody in one pool and a stable pairing may not exist. Allow rings as well as pairs and something stable always exists — and the pairs-only answer fails exactly when that stable arrangement contains a ring of odd length. Two sides make every ring even, which is the whole reason the two-sided theorem holds.

7 figures
The duality theorem's four cases, counted over 6,561 small programs. A three-by-three table crossing the status of a linear program — optimal, unbounded or infeasible — with the status of its dual, counting every small program with coefficients from minus one to one. Five of the nine cells are empty.

When one of the two numbers is missing

The duality theorem is usually quoted as an equality: a linear program and its dual reach the same number. That is one of four cases. A program can run away to infinity, or have no feasible point at all, and then its dual is forced into a matching failure. Every small program with coefficients from minus one to one has been classified, and the table has exactly four occupied cells out of nine.

5 figures · new
The optimum as the lowest of 3 lines, one per dual vertex. The optimal value of a linear program plotted against one right-hand side, drawn over a family of straight lines, one for each vertex of the dual feasible region. The optimum follows the lowest line throughout.

The lines the optimum lies under

Change the resources a linear program is given and its best value changes too, tracing a graph. Every solution of the dual is a straight line lying above that graph, and the graph is exactly the lowest of those lines — a bent roof of finitely many planks. Require the answer to be in whole numbers and the roof stays where it was while the graph falls away beneath it in steps, and the space between is the part of the problem no price can see.

6 figures · new