Fairness
Named by 11 essays across 2 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
Half the time is the rarest answer
In a fair game of many rounds, the fraction of the time one side is ahead is not usually near a half. It is usually near nought or one, and an even split is the single least likely outcome there is.
A lottery over whole assignments
A table of shares in which every person's shares add to one task and every task is exactly covered is never anything more than a mixture of whole assignments — and finding the mixture is a matter of taking one complete assignment out at a time.
The order everybody arrives in
Three people jointly earn nine, and the question is what each is owed. Ask instead what each adds on walking into a room the others are already in, average that over every order they could have arrived in, and four modest conditions leave no other answer.
A split nobody can walk away from
Every way of dividing what a group earns is a point of a triangle, and every coalition's threat to leave cuts a straight line across it. What survives all the cuts is the set of stable divisions — and for one three-player game there is nothing left.
Sharing a cost that is not the sum of its parts
Three users need capacities three, six and twelve of one shared thing, and serving any group costs the largest of them. Averaging what each adds over every order of arrival divides the bill — and for this family the average collapses to a rule anybody could apply by hand.
Seats to parties and places at once
Seats can be given to regions in proportion to one list of populations, and no rule does it perfectly. Ask for seats to regions and to parties simultaneously and the object stops being a list — and the impossibility that closed the subject does not apply.
One table, two lotteries
A table of shares says what fraction of each task each person does. It does not say how — the same table is a mixture of whole assignments in many different ways, and the differences are exactly what the people being assigned would care about.
The table inside every quota
Give seats to districts and parties at once, and every cell of the table has a fair share it ought to round from. A table rounding every cell to its floor or its ceiling, with every total exact, always exists. The biproportional method does not always choose one: here it gives a party 2 seats where its fair share is 3.088.
An objection one player makes to another
The core lets a coalition object to everybody at once. Narrow it to one player objecting to one other, require every such objection to be met by an equally loud one coming back, and exactly one split survives — with no dictionary order anywhere in the argument.
Cutting a link costs both of its ends the same
Three players, any two of whom can earn 1 together — but only if they are linked. Link all three and each is due a third. Remove one link and the player holding both of the others is due two thirds. Averaging over orders on the game the network allows is the one rule under which breaking any link costs the two players it joined exactly the same, and it pays go-betweens more than their links.
The matching in the middle
List every stable matching of a market, give each member their stable partners sorted from best to worst, and hand each the one in the middle. Nothing says the result should even be a matching — two people might pick the same partner — and yet it always is one, it is always stable, and the other side gets its median partners too.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Exhaustive searchCooperative gameCoalitionMarginal contributionPermutationPolytopeShapley valueAllocationApportionmentAssignmentConvexityCore