Decided by exhaustion — page 4
Almost every number comes down
The Collatz conjecture is open and a great deal about it is not. Whether a number falls below its own start in the first few steps is decided entirely by its remainder on division by a power of two, and the share of numbers for which it happens can be counted exactly.
The test that ranks the generators
Every linear generator's output lies on a family of parallel planes. Which generator is better is decided by how far apart those planes are, and that distance is the length of the shortest whole-number vector the modulus annihilates — a quantity that can be computed exactly rather than estimated by testing.
Four numbers and the rule is yours
A linear generator can be solved. Given a few of its outputs, the multiplier and the increment fall out of two congruences, and every future output is then known exactly — which is a failure of a completely different kind from the lattice defect, and is not detected by any test of how evenly the points are spread.
Nineteen thousand bits of state
The generator most simulations actually use is not clever. It is a linear recurrence over the two-element field with an enormous state, and its virtues are a proved period, a proved equidistribution and speed — none of which is unpredictability, which it does not have and does not claim.
The corners are whole assignments
A table of shares can be written as a lottery over whole assignments, which the anchor's first rung demonstrates on one example. The general statement is that the corners of the set of such tables are exactly the whole assignments, and that single fact is why the whole subject is easy.
No rule escapes the doctrinal paradox
A court whose members each hold a consistent position can reach an inconsistent verdict by majority. The anchor's first rung exhibits one such case, which invites the hope that a better rule would avoid it — and every rule that responds to the votes at all fails somewhere.
How many worlds a formula can need
A modal formula can be true in a model with infinitely many worlds. It can also be true in a small one — and the small one is built from the large one by throwing away every distinction the formula was never able to make.
Nearly always, or nearly never
Toss a coin for every pair of points and ask whether the graph that results has some property. For a property a first-order sentence can state, the answer in the limit is never a genuine probability — it is zero or it is one, and the game is what proves it.
The distance a sentence can see
A first-order sentence with three quantifiers cannot notice anything about a graph beyond a fixed distance from the points it names. That single limitation is why it cannot say connected, and why the failure survives every attempt to add more quantifiers.
Infinitely many of one kind
Euclid's argument produces a prime nobody had listed, and says nothing about what it looks like. Ask for infinitely many primes ending in 3, or leaving a remainder of 1 on division by 4, and the same construction has to be aimed — and for most targets nobody knows how to aim it.
Which infinitudes are proved
The primes never stop, and neither — apparently — do the twin pairs, the primes one more than a square, or the Mersenne primes. Three of those four statements are theorems and one is not, and counting the members of each family tells nobody which.
The only bit that survives
A shuffle can be called even or odd, and the label behaves under composition. Ask whether some cleverer label — a number out of three, or out of four — could behave the same way, and the answer is that nothing else can — one bit is exactly what a permutation gives up.