Voting rules — the series
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The majority that goes in a circle
Every voter hands in a ranking, and a ranking is transitive by construction. Compare the candidates two at a time and let the majority decide each pair, and the verdicts need not fit together into a ranking at all.
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Five rules and five winners
Twenty-seven ranked ballots, five entirely reasonable ways of counting them, and five different candidates declared the winner. Every count is correct, every rule is defensible, and the answer turns out to be a property of the rule rather than of the ballots.
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Four conditions, and no rule that has all of them
Five reasonable rules can return five different winners on one set of ballots, which invites the obvious question of which one is right. The answer is that the conditions anybody would write down cannot all hold at once — and here each named rule's own violation is found by search rather than quoted.
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A lie that pays
A ballot is usually read as a report of a preference. This one reads it as a move, and walks every move one voter has — all six rankings, the winner each produces, and the ones that beat honesty.
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How often the majority goes in a circle
Three voters and three candidates give 216 profiles, and 12 of them are cycles. Count every electorate up to 41 voters exactly and the share climbs towards 8.77%, a number Guilbaud found in 1952 as the solid angle where three half-spaces at the tetrahedral angle overlap. Add candidates and a winner goes missing half the time; let voters share one axis and cycles vanish. The number is always a property of the model of how ballots are drawn.
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A majority wiser than its members
Condorcet's other theorem turns voting round: the voters no longer have preferences but judgements about a single fact, each a little more likely right than wrong. Then a simple majority of many of them is almost certainly right — 6,763 voters who are each right 51% of the time make a majority right 95% of the time. The theorem survives voters worse than a coin, if the average is better. It does not survive voters who share their mistakes, and when their skills differ the right rule weighs votes rather than counting them.
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How few voters any majority needs
Any pattern of head-to-head majorities whatever — cycles within cycles, a candidate who beats the winner of every other contest and loses to its loser — can be produced by voters who each rank the candidates sensibly. McGarvey's recipe needs n(n − 1) of them for n candidates. The truth is far fewer: every pattern on five candidates takes three voters at most, a counting argument shows the number must eventually grow, and it grows only like n divided by its logarithm.
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The fewest swaps to a winner
When no candidate beats every other head to head, Charles Dodgson proposed in 1876 to elect the one that is closest to doing so — the candidate that the fewest swaps of neighbouring names on the ballots would turn into a winner of every contest. The rule is easy to state and hard to compute: the count needs a search, and deciding the winner is provably among the hardest problems of its kind. A much simpler count, the votes still to be won, usually agrees, more often the larger the electorate.
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A party that loses every issue can win
Two parties take opposite sides on three issues, and every voter backs the party they agree with on more of them. The party that wins the election can be on the losing side of all three issues — in a fifth of random electorates it loses most of them, and in about one in a hundred it loses every one. A majority of voters can even find themselves outvoted on most of the questions decided. Only when issues are settled by three-to-one majorities on average is that ruled out.
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How often the rules find the majority favourite
When one candidate beats every rival head to head, a voting rule ought to elect it. Plurality does about three times in four when every ranking is equally likely, the runoff between the top two 96 times in a hundred, Borda's count 90. Every profile of up to 51 voters is counted exactly, the limit is sampled, and adding candidates pulls plurality down below one half.
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A chain of majorities leads anywhere
Put voters on a line and the middle one's position beats everything. Put five in a plane and nothing is safe: seven majority votes can walk the group from its own centre to a place every one of them likes less. One small circle, drawn through the lines that split the voters, says exactly how far a single vote can go, and it shrinks as the group grows.