Equilibrium — the series
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The value from both sides
Two choosers move at the same instant, and each asks the cautious question — how much can be guaranteed, whatever the other does. With pure choices the two answers are usually different numbers; allow a probability and they are forced to be the same one.
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The road that makes everyone later
An equilibrium is a state nobody can improve alone, which is a much weaker thing than a state anybody would choose. Adding a link that costs nothing to use makes every traveller in this network strictly slower, and the arithmetic says by exactly how much.
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A signal both can see
Two choosers who randomise privately can reach a set of outcomes that is smaller, and worse, than the set they reach when a device draws one cell and whispers each of them their half of it. Nothing is enforced and nobody is bound, and the arrangement is stable anyway.
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The landscape nobody is looking at
Letting participants move one at a time to whatever is currently better can cycle forever, and on a network of congestible roads it cannot. The reason is a single number attached to each state that falls by exactly what the mover saves.
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Two equilibria and no way to choose
A game can have two states nobody wants to leave, one paying more than the other, and the definition of an equilibrium has nothing to say about which happens. The two standard tie-breakers disagree, and the one that wins is usually the worse.
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A mixture that is a population
A mixed equilibrium between two choosers is a knife-edge nobody has a reason to stand on. Read the same mixture as a population whose shares grow with how well they do, and it becomes a point every population is carried to — or one every population circles for ever without arriving.
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Worth more for being seen first
Moving first sounds like a disadvantage, since the other side gets to see the move and answer it. When the move is a mixture that is announced and believed, it is never a disadvantage, it is worth exactly nothing in a game of pure conflict, and in other games it is worth more than any equilibrium — sometimes by announcing an action that would never be played in secret.
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Patience instead of a contract
Commitment had to assume an announcement binds. Play the same game again tomorrow and the assumption is unnecessary — the future does the binding. What it costs is that nearly every outcome becomes an equilibrium, so a theory that could not choose between two now cannot choose between infinitely many.
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The reading that is almost right
Every account of simultaneous choice so far has assumed the payoffs are known to both choosers and known to be known. Replace that with each chooser seeing a private reading off by a little, and a band of equilibria closes to a single point — so the assumption nobody states decides the answer.
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Two auctions that earn the same
In one sealed-bid auction the winner pays its own bid; in the other it pays the second-highest bid. Bidders behave completely differently — in the second they bid what the object is worth to them, in the first they shade their bids down by exactly a fraction — and the seller's revenue is spread differently. Yet the seller expects to collect precisely the same amount, (n − 1)/(n + 1) for n bidders with values spread evenly, and so does an auction in which everybody pays. The equality breaks the moment bidders dislike risk, and it says nothing about how much a reserve price can add.
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A third of random games have no pure equilibrium
Fill a game's payoff table with random numbers and ask whether some cell is each player's best reply to the other. Exactly one cell is expected to be, at every size, and the chance that none is climbs from one in eight to 1/e — the same constant that counts the shuffles in which nobody gets their own hat back, and for the same reason.
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Every random game has an odd number of equilibria
Find every equilibrium of eleven thousand random games — pure and mixed, by trying every pair of strategy sets the players might mix over — and the totals are 1, 3, 5, 7, … and never an even number. The count is a sum of signs: equilibria of index +1 outnumber those of −1 by exactly one in every game. The average grows about 28% with each strategy added, and searching for the game with the most turns up the coordination game's 2ⁿ − 1, a pattern that holds only up to five strategies.