A set, its negation, and its double negation
opens is one function. Everything below came out of it during this
build, at parameters taken from the essays rather than invented for this page — so a figure
here is the same figure a reader meets in an essay, and if the generator changes, this page
changes with it.
With nothing chosen
Three truth values, two of which count as holding
Which classical rules survive a contradiction
Same tautologies, fewer consequences
What follows from a body of information with one contradiction
Belnap's four values on one diamond
What it checks while it draws
Collected by running the family and recording what it asserted, not written here. The count is how many separate times the claim was put to the test while these drawings were made.
- the 2-chain validates G2 exactly when 2 > 2 ×30
- G3 holds in the 2-chain and fails in the 3-chain ×5
- an algebra of 2 elements validates Gödel's disjunction in 3 letters ×4
- at p = 1/2 every multiple of 1/2 occurs ×3
- at p = 1/2 every value is a multiple of 1/2 ×3
- the tent at 1/2 is defined by some formula with at most 8 connectives ×2
- ¬¬¬p → ¬p holds in every algebra searched ×1
- ¬¬p holds at a state exactly when p is reachable above every branch ×1
- ¬p → q ∨ r ⟹ (¬p → q) ∨ (¬p → r) holds in every algebra searched ×1
- 234 assignments satisfy eight of the nine bases ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: (¬p) ∧ (p ∨ q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: (¬p) ∨ (p ∧ q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: (¬q) ∧ (p ∨ q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: (¬q) ∨ (p ∧ q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: (p ∧ q) ∨ (¬(p ∧ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: (p ∧ q) ∨ (¬(p ∨ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: (p ∨ q) ∧ (¬(p ∧ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: (p ∨ q) ∧ (¬(p ∨ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(p ∧ (q ∨ (¬p))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(p ∧ (q ∨ (¬q))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(p ∧ q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(p ∨ (q ∧ (¬p))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(p ∨ (q ∧ (¬q))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(p ∨ q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(q ∧ (p ∨ (¬p))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(q ∧ (p ∨ (¬q))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(q ∨ (p ∧ (¬p))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬(q ∨ (p ∧ (¬q))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬p ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: ¬q ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (¬(p ∧ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (¬(p ∨ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (¬p) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (¬q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (q ∧ (¬(p ∧ q))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (q ∧ (¬(p ∨ q))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (q ∧ (¬p)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (q ∧ (¬q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (q ∨ (¬p)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ (q ∨ (¬q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∧ q ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (¬(p ∧ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (¬(p ∨ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (¬p) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (¬q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (q ∧ (¬p)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (q ∧ (¬q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (q ∨ (¬(p ∧ q))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (q ∨ (¬(p ∨ q))) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (q ∨ (¬p)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ (q ∨ (¬q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: p ∨ q ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∧ (¬(p ∧ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∧ (¬(p ∨ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∧ (¬p) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∧ (¬q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∧ (p ∨ (¬p)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∧ (p ∨ (¬q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∨ (¬(p ∧ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∨ (¬(p ∨ q)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∨ (¬p) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∨ (¬q) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∨ (p ∧ (¬p)) ×1
- a formula is a classical tautology exactly when it always holds in the logic of paradox: q ∨ (p ∧ (¬q)) ×1
- a formula that survives three values fails at four ×1
- a set is contained in its double negation ×1
- and fails under Łukasiewicz's ×1
- and here it is strictly contained — the punched-out points come back ×1
- and it keeps rising, so the classes are not exhausted by short formulas ×1
- and r does not follow, because q may be a glut ×1
- and so does double-negation elimination ×1
- and the value really is not the top ×1
- at depth four there are sixteen inequivalent formulas ×1
- between one and four points are punched out ×1
- both models are chain frames and the glued one is not ×1
- both models are one-top frames and the glued one is not ×1
- both-and-neither is false and both-or-neither is true ×1
- classically, from ¬(p ∧ q), infer ¬p ∨ ¬q ×1
- classically, from ¬¬p, infer p ×1
- classically, from p ∧ q, infer p ×1
- classically, from p ∨ q and ¬q, infer p ×1
- classically, from p and ¬p ∨ q, infer q ×1
- classically, from p and ¬p, infer q ×1
- classically, from p, infer p ∨ q ×1
- classically, inconsistent premises imply everything ×1
- classically, infer p ∨ ¬p from nothing ×1
- collapsing the top two values respects implication ×1
- contraction holds under Gödel's implication ×1
- each basis is the one left out in 26 near-solutions ×1
- each row and column multiplies to plus or minus the identity ×1
- ends are 0 or 1 ×1
- every assignment of true and false to the eighteen directions is counted ×1
- every element sits below its double negation ×1
- every formula is 0 or 1 at the ends ×1
- every glued frame is a frame of the constructive system ×1
- every inference the logic of paradox accepts is classically valid ×1
- every piece has a whole-number slope ×1
- every piece's line has a whole-number intercept ×1
- every punched-out point is inside the set ×1
- every smaller algebra validates (p → q) ∨ (q → p) ×1
- every smaller algebra validates ¬¬p → p ×1
- every smaller algebra validates ¬p ∨ ¬¬p ×1
- every smaller algebra validates p ∨ ¬p ×1
- every truth set is closed upwards ×1
- exactly one product, the last column, is minus the identity ×1
- excluded middle fails at neither ×1
- excluded middle fails at the root and its double negation holds everywhere ×1
- excluded middle fails somewhere in this algebra ×1
- excluded middle first fails in the three-chain ×1
- excluded middle holds on each one-stage model and fails once they are glued ×1
- formulas of up to 3 to 6 nestings ×1
- G4 first fails in the four-chain ×1
- Gödel–Dummett logic's axiom picks out its frames ×1
- Gödel's implication is linear ×1
- in the logic of paradox s is not settled, though s ∨ ¬s is ×1
- intuitionistic validity implies classical ×1
- it keeps excluded middle, which the gap logic loses ×1
- more than four formulas in one variable are distinguished ×1
- negation undoes itself ×1
- neither p/2 nor the constant one half appears ×1
- no assignment of plus and minus one satisfies all six products ×1
- no colouring of Peres's thirty-three directions exists ×1
- no open set larger than the implication satisfies the condition ×1
- no two chains glue into a chain ×1
- no two frames with one last stage glue into one ×1
- on chains one letter gives six formulas and two give 342 ×1
- p ∨ ¬p is designated at every value ×1
- Peres's set has 33 directions, 16 orthogonal triads and 72 orthogonal pairs ×1
- removing any one of Peres's directions allows a colouring ×1
- so does Peirce's law ×1
- so is Łukasiewicz's ×1
- some axiom holds in one algebra and fails in another ×1
- the 49 directions with coordinates in {0, ±1, ±2} have no colouring ×1
- the algebra has at least two elements ×1
- the basis left out always holds an even number of true directions ×1
- the count never falls as the formulas grow ×1
- the counts the table reports ×1
- the depth-two model for two letters has 265,454 up-sets ×1
- the disjunction's value is the second-highest truth value ×1
- the double negation survives every model exactly when the formula is a tautology ×1
- the drawn near-solution makes four directions true ×1
- the equivalence is one minus the distance ×1
- the first model refutes the first disjunct at its root ×1
- the first model's root forces the same things after gluing ×1
- the formula (p ⊕ p) ⊙ ¬(p ⊙ p) is among those enumerated ×1
- the formula ¬p is among those enumerated ×1
- the formula p ∧ ¬p is among those enumerated ×1
- the formula p ⊕ p is among those enumerated ×1
- the formula p ⊙ p is among those enumerated ×1
- the formula p is among those enumerated ×1
- the formulas are among em, wem, dnn, gd, kp, triple ×1
- the gap logic has no tautologies at all ×1
- the glued valuation only ever grows ×1
- the implication really does meet the antecedent inside the consequent ×1
- the implication really is the largest element whose meet lies below ×1
- the logic of paradox rejects explosion, modus ponens for ∨, and the disjunctive syllogism ×1
- the logic of the weak law's axiom picks out its frames ×1
- the negation of an open set is open ×1
- the new root forces neither disjunct, so it does not force the disjunction ×1
- the number of conditions met is always odd ×1
- the option is one this view reads ×1
- the orders are among point, chain2, chain3, anti2, v, lambda, diamond ×1
- the pair is one of em, gd, wem, deep ×1
- the probabilities of each basis add up to one ×1
- the propagating search refutes Peres's set after a few dozen choices ×1
- the refuting algebra has a valuation making (p → q) ∨ (q → p) fall short ×1
- the refuting algebra has a valuation making ¬¬p → p fall short ×1
- the refuting algebra has a valuation making ¬p ∨ ¬¬p fall short ×1
- the refuting algebra has a valuation making p ∨ ¬p fall short ×1
- the search has several algebras in it ×1
- the search runs over orders on up to 2 to 4 points ×1
- the search separates the formulas it refutes from the ones it cannot ×1
- the second model refutes the second disjunct at its root ×1
- the separating algebras run to 2 to 4 points ×1
- the set sits strictly inside the ambient line ×1
- the set together with its negation does not fill the line ×1
- the shortest formulas grow by the golden ratio per step ×1
- the shrinking finds sets of thirty-one ×1
- the smallest set found is uncolourable and every direction in it is needed ×1
- the thirty-three of Peres ×1
- the three lines are distinct, so any two of them span the plane and meet only at the origin ×1
- the union has as many pieces as the two sets between them ×1
- the view is one the family draws ×1
- the weak law and linearity hold in every chain ×1
- thirty-one directions with no colouring ×1
- three negations are the same as one ×1
- three negations collapse in every Heyting algebra ×1
- three negations collapse to one ×1
- three to five letters ×1
- two letters give four final states and eighteen states one step before them ×1
- values stay in the interval ×1
- which is not the top, so the formula fails ×1
- with p both true and false, p ∧ ¬p is designated while a false q is not ×1
Where it is called
Every figure on this list is drawn by the same rule, so a change to the rule changes all of them at once. That is why the list is published.
A contradiction that stays where it is
In classical logic one contradiction proves everything: from p and not-p, any q at all. Add a third truth value — both true and false — and count it as holding, and the explosion stops. The classical laws all survive as laws; what goes is exactly the reasoning that carries a contradiction somewhere it was not. Run the other way, the same three tables make a logic of gaps instead of gluts.
LogicA proof that says which half
Classical logic proves p ∨ ¬p without any idea which half is true. The constructive system never does that: whenever it proves a disjunction, it proves one of the two halves. The reason is a picture — two countermodels placed side by side above a new first stage that forces neither — and the logics between the two lose the property exactly when their pictures are not allowed to be glued.
LogicEvery tautology survives double negation
Intuitionistic logic refuses excluded middle, Peirce's law and every other classical principle that claims more than can be shown. Glivenko proved in 1929 that it refuses nothing outright: put ¬¬ in front of any classical tautology and the result is intuitionistically valid. Every Kripke model of up to four states confirms it for eight famous laws, a census of 11,451 formulas confirms it one by one, and a model with a growing domain shows where it stops.
LogicNo table of truth values is enough
Two truth values decide classical logic. Gödel asked in 1932 whether some longer list of values could decide the constructive system, and answered with a pigeonhole: with n values, some two of n + 1 statements must share one, so a formula saying exactly that holds in every n-valued table and is not a theorem. The chains of truth values then descend forever, and what they share is a logic of its own — the logic of the real interval.
LogicNo way to hand out true and false
Birkhoff and von Neumann read the propositions of quantum mechanics as subspaces, with "and" the intersection and "or" the span. Three lines in a plane already break the distributive law. Kochen and Specker proved something stronger: the propositions cannot be called true and false at all, if every complete measurement is to have exactly one true outcome. Cabello's eighteen directions in four dimensions show why in one line of arithmetic — nine bases, each direction in two of them, and nine is odd — and a search of all 262,144 assignments confirms it.
LogicNot one step but a continuum
Classical logic is the constructive system plus one axiom, which makes it sound as though there are two logics and one gap. There are uncountably many logics in that gap, each one a class of algebras, and the smallest separations between them fit in five elements.
LogicRefutable in something small
A formula that is not a theorem of the constructive system fails in some finite algebra, and the algebra can be found by search. That single property is what makes the propositional logic decidable — and the predicate version loses the property and the decidability with it.
LogicThe middle that is not excluded
Either it is raining or it is not. Drop that as an axiom and what is left is still a logic — one with models made of open sets and of stages of knowledge, in which a set and its negation between them miss the boundary.
LogicThe second letter breaks the pattern
In one letter the constructive logic has infinitely many formulas, but they climb in a column two wide, four new ones for every step a state of knowledge can take. Add a second letter and the pattern is gone: sixteen formulas at the last step, 265,454 one step back, and more than two to the power 265,428 one step further. Every one of those is a genuine formula, and the reason the two-letter lattice has never been drawn is that each layer of the model is about as large as the number of formulas the layer above can tell apart.
LogicThe zigzags a formula can draw
Let truth be any number from 0 to 1, and Łukasiewicz's connectives turn every formula in one variable into a graph. Every graph that appears is a zigzag of straight pieces with whole-number slopes, ending at 0 or 1 — and McNaughton proved in 1951 that every such zigzag appears. A logic of degrees of truth turns out to be a theory of piecewise-linear functions with integer coefficients.
LogicThirty-one directions nobody can label
In four dimensions eighteen directions are enough to show that quantum measurements cannot have answers waiting in advance, and a parity count does it in a line. In three dimensions, where Kochen and Specker first proved it, no parity count works and the smallest known set has thirty-one directions. Peres's thirty-three can be checked by hand; Conway and Kochen's thirty-one fall out of a search through every direction with coordinates between −2 and 2; and whether thirty or fewer could ever do is still being settled by exhaustive computation, which has so far ruled out everything up to twenty-four.