Generator

A profile of 100 ranked ballots, and the majority in every pair

A generator in the applied library, called 129 times across 23 essays. Below: what it draws with nothing chosen and at each mode an essay asks for, what it checks while drawing, and everywhere it is used.

ballot is one function. Everything below came out of it during this build, at parameters taken from the essays rather than invented for this page — so a figure here is the same figure a reader meets in an essay, and if the generator changes, this page changes with it.

With nothing chosen

A profile of 100 ranked ballots, and the majority in every pair. The voter groups as columns with the ranking down each, beside the pairwise majority matrix whose cells are the margins.

Everything that beats one proposal

Everything that beats one proposal. Five voters in the plane and the set of points beating the proposal (0.5, 0.6) by a majority, area 1.842.

On a line the median cannot be beaten

On a line the median cannot be beaten. Nine voters on a line with median at 0.4: against every rival position, the median collects at least 5 of 9 votes.

A balance that one small shift destroys

A balance that one small shift destroys. Plott's symmetric arrangement with one voter at the centre and two opposed pairs: the win set of the centre has area 0: 0.0000; 0.25: 0.0010; 0.8: 0.0229 as one voter moves.

A chain of majorities that leads anywhere

A chain of majorities that leads anywhere. 7 majority votes from the middle of five voters to a target outside all of them: the chain goes as far as 5.02 from the yolk's centre, whose radius is 0.4877.

The smallest circle that meets every median line

The smallest circle that meets every median line. For the five voters, 5 median lines and a yolk of radius 0.48775 at (-0.0440, 0.2642), touching 3 lines.

What it checks while it draws

Collected by running the family and recording what it asserted, not written here. The count is how many separate times the claim was put to the test while these drawings were made.

Where it is called

Every figure on this list is drawn by the same rule, so a change to the rule changes all of them at once. That is why the list is published.

Applied

A chain of majorities leads anywhere

Put voters on a line and the middle one's position beats everything. Put five in a plane and nothing is safe: seven majority votes can walk the group from its own centre to a place every one of them likes less. One small circle, drawn through the lines that split the voters, says exactly how far a single vote can go, and it shrinks as the group grows.

Applied

A lie that pays

A ballot is usually read as a report of a preference. This one reads it as a move, and walks every move one voter has — all six rankings, the winner each produces, and the ones that beat honesty.

Applied

A majority wiser than its members

Condorcet's other theorem turns voting round: the voters no longer have preferences but judgements about a single fact, each a little more likely right than wrong. Then a simple majority of many of them is almost certainly right — 6,763 voters who are each right 51% of the time make a majority right 95% of the time. The theorem survives voters worse than a coin, if the average is better. It does not survive voters who share their mistakes, and when their skills differ the right rule weighs votes rather than counting them.

Applied

A party that loses every issue can win

Two parties take opposite sides on three issues, and every voter backs the party they agree with on more of them. The party that wins the election can be on the losing side of all three issues — in a fifth of random electorates it loses most of them, and in about one in a hundred it loses every one. A majority of voters can even find themselves outvoted on most of the questions decided. Only when issues are settled by three-to-one majorities on average is that ruled out.

Applied

A share of the votes is not a share of the power

Give three members four, four and one vote, with five needed to pass. Every winning coalition needs exactly two of them, so all three have equal power — and one of them holds a ninth of the votes.

Applied

Agendas that cannot contradict themselves

A court voting on two unconnected questions never contradicts itself, and neither does one voting on a chain of thresholds. A court voting on two premises and their conjunction sometimes does. What separates them is the size of the smallest sets of judgements that cannot all be true: pairs are harmless, because two majorities always share a judge, and triples are not. The same count says exactly how large a supermajority has to be to stay consistent on any agenda.

Applied

Deciding the premises or the conclusion

A body that cannot be both decisive and coherent has to choose which. The two live options are to vote on the reasons and let the verdict follow, or to vote on the verdict and let the reasons look after themselves — and they reach opposite answers on exactly the profiles the impossibility identifies.

Applied

Every premise makes the verdict vote stricter

A court that must find several things true before it finds liability can vote on each of them or on the verdict. With two elements, judges right seven times in ten are enough for either. With five, the verdict vote needs judges right eighty-seven times in a hundred, or a larger court makes it worse — while the premise vote still needs only better than even. And when any one ground is enough instead of all, the two procedures swap their failures.

Applied

Five rules and five winners

Twenty-seven ranked ballots, five entirely reasonable ways of counting them, and five different candidates declared the winner. Every count is correct, every rule is defensible, and the answer turns out to be a property of the rule rather than of the ballots.

Applied

Four conditions, and no rule that has all of them

Five reasonable rules can return five different winners on one set of ballots, which invites the obvious question of which one is right. The answer is that the conditions anybody would write down cannot all hold at once — and here each named rule's own violation is found by search rather than quoted.

Applied

Four ways out, and what each costs

An impossibility theorem lists conditions and says no rule has them all. That leaves exactly as many escapes as there are conditions, each of them a real institution — a dictator, a two-stage procedure, a supermajority, a restricted agenda — and each escape's price can be counted rather than argued about.

Applied

How few voters any majority needs

Any pattern of head-to-head majorities whatever — cycles within cycles, a candidate who beats the winner of every other contest and loses to its loser — can be produced by voters who each rank the candidates sensibly. McGarvey's recipe needs n(n − 1) of them for n candidates. The truth is far fewer: every pattern on five candidates takes three voters at most, a counting argument shows the number must eventually grow, and it grows only like n divided by its logarithm.

Applied

How often the majority goes in a circle

Three voters and three candidates give 216 profiles, and 12 of them are cycles. Count every electorate up to 41 voters exactly and the share climbs towards 8.77%, a number Guilbaud found in 1952 as the solid angle where three half-spaces at the tetrahedral angle overlap. Add candidates and a winner goes missing half the time; let voters share one axis and cycles vanish. The number is always a property of the model of how ballots are drawn.

Applied

How often the rules find the majority favourite

When one candidate beats every rival head to head, a voting rule ought to elect it. Plurality does about three times in four when every ranking is equally likely, the runoff between the top two 96 times in a hundred, Borda's count 90. Every profile of up to 51 voters is counted exactly, the limit is sampled, and adding candidates pulls plurality down below one half.

Applied

No rule escapes the doctrinal paradox

A court whose members each hold a consistent position can reach an inconsistent verdict by majority. One such case is easy to build, which invites the hope that a better rule would avoid it — and every rule that responds to the votes at all fails somewhere.

Applied

None of the four conditions is spare

Four conditions pick out one sharing rule. The half that is usually shown is that they are enough; the other half is that each is needed — drop any one and a different rule satisfies the rest, so the list cannot be shortened.

Applied

The court that contradicts itself

Three judges each answer three questions, and each answers them consistently. Take the majority on each question separately and the answers no longer hang together — the body as a whole endorses a combination no member of it holds, and no rearrangement of the procedure removes the problem.

Applied

The element the judges are worst at

A court can vote element by element or on the verdict, and the comparison so far assumed judges equally good at every element. Real judges are surer about the law than about a contested fact. Make one element hard and both procedures sink towards the majority on that element, but they sink differently: the verdict vote sees only the product of the judges' competences and cannot tell an even court from a lopsided one, while the premise vote is ruled by its weakest majority. And when a judge's errors on two elements come from the same misreading of the facts, the gap between the procedures closes.

Applied

The fewest swaps to a winner

When no candidate beats every other head to head, Charles Dodgson proposed in 1876 to elect the one that is closest to doing so — the candidate that the fewest swaps of neighbouring names on the ballots would turn into a winner of every contest. The rule is easy to state and hard to compute: the count needs a search, and deciding the winner is provably among the hardest problems of its kind. A much simpler count, the votes still to be won, usually agrees, more often the larger the electorate.

Applied

The majority that goes in a circle

Every voter hands in a ranking, and a ranking is transitive by construction. Compare the candidates two at a time and let the majority decide each pair, and the verdicts need not fit together into a ranking at all.

Applied

The nearest consistent verdict

When a court's majorities contradict each other, one repair is to announce the consistent verdict that disagrees with the judges least. It treats the premises and the conclusion alike, which neither of the two standard procedures does. On the classic case it returns a three-way tie; on five judges, with every question weighted equally, it never returns a single answer on a troubled profile at all — and what breaks the tie is a decision about which question matters more.

Applied

What the agenda leaves standing

Ask for a rule that settles each question from the votes on that question, follows a unanimous court and never contradicts itself, and search every such rule for three judges. On a ranking of three options, three survive: one dictator per judge. On two premises and their conjunction, seven survive: every rule in which a fixed set of judges must all agree. On a chain of thresholds, a hundred and twenty-nine, majority among them. The difference is not in the rules. It is in which answers force which, and whether that forcing ever runs back.

Applied

Which vote finds the truth more often

A court that must decide two premises and their conjunction can vote on the premises or on the conclusion, and the two votes sometimes disagree. Suppose there is a right answer and each judge is more often right than wrong. Then the question has an exact answer: for three judges the conclusion vote is more often right when competence is below √½ and the premise vote above it, and in a large court the premise vote wins at any competence — while the conclusion vote turns out to be a built-in standard of proof.

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